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Embedded Neopatrimonialism:
Patriarchy and Democracy in Turkey
Meral Ugur-Cinar*
This article argues that patriarchal discourses can play a legitimizing role for the
undemocratic elements of regimes. It focuses on neopatrimonial regimes in con-
temporary politics, which create impediments to democracy. Showing neopatri-
monialism’s link to patriarchal discourses, the study highlights the need to situate
neopatrimonialism beyond its dominant contemporary usage as material ex-
change between the ruler and the ruled for political support. The Turkish case is
analyzed to show how neopatrimonial acts of politicians are justified with a patri-
archal discourse that is paternalistic and serves to reinforce personalistic rule, de-
legitimize opposition, and suppress pluralism.
Introduction
Yet another routine day in Turkish politics: “You cannot bring women and
men to equal conditions,” President Erdogan stated, “it is against their na-
ture.” This statement, ironically made at the Women and Justice Summit
(CNN Turk 2014B), echoes his previous statements (for similar statements
see: Bianet 2014; Hogg and Pamuk 2014; Steinvorth 2012). Nor is Erdogan
alone. For example, one of the co-founders of the Justice and Development
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP), Bülent Arınç, has argued that a
woman “should not laugh loudly in front of all the world and should preserve
her decency at all times” (The Guardian 2014).
Such statements broadly represent the governing mentality in Turkish poli-
tics. According to the Gender Gap Index, Turkey ranks 130th out of 144 coun-
tries (World Economic Forum 2016). The literature on Turkey has shown
how the status of women has been negatively impacted by the joint trends of
conservatism and neoliberalism under AKP rule (Cosar and Yegenoglu, 2011),
which exposes women to market insecurities and reinforces their domestic
roles (Bugra 2014; Yılmaz Şener 2016).
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Does this patriarchal attitude only hurt women? Is it only the concern of
people who care about women’s rights? What kind of political leverage do rul-
ers hope to derive from such statements? One of the main motivations of this
article is to show that understanding these speeches solely in terms of male–
female relations misses the central dynamics of politics. As Eisenstein (1994,
31) has argued “as long as feminism, however it is defined, is thought of as
‘dada’ by leaders . . . the struggle toward real democracy will be much more
difficult. Totalitarianism and bureaucratic statism cannot be fully dismantled
without addressing the unquestioned patriarchal privileging of men in the
state, the economy, and the home.” This statement points us in the right
direction.
From a political vantage point, there is indeed an inseparable relationship
between democracy and a more equal gender discourse. Yet is this only because
women will have more rights in a more democratic society? The gender–regime
nexus runs much deeper than this: the relationship is not unidirectional but
goes both ways. This article will show that patriarchal political discourse con-
tributes substantially to the undemocratic elements of regimes. To do so, it will
focus on a particular regime type, neopatrimonial regimes.
Democracy and Neopatrimonialism
As the existing literature has shown, neopatrimonialism is inherently anti-
democratic (Erdmann and Engel 2007, 114; Van de Walle 2007, 1).
Neopatrimonialism is based on a system that ensures the stability of authori-
tarian regimes while at the same time undermining political participation and
competition (Van de Walle 2007, 1). Neopatrimonialism is detrimental to lib-
eral democracy, which rests on pluralism, checks and balances mechanisms,
and rule of law, among other principles. Under neopatrimonial regimes, lead-
ers are “largely above the law and not subject to the checks and balances that
democratic executives face in mature democracies” (Van de Walle 2007, 1–2).
In an ideal democracy, different opinions can be voiced without incurring
punishment and public services are provided according to institutionalized
rules. However, there are leaders who would prefer that things go in accor-
dance with their worldviews and that they allocate state resources as they
wish. Patriarchal discourses can be used to justify such actions.
To unearth the multifaceted dynamics between gender discourse and re-
gime type this article will show how patriarchal tropes play an enabling role in
neopatrimonialism. In doing so, the study argues that neopatrimonialism in-
volves more than a material exchange between the ruler and the ruled for po-
litical support. Rather neopatrimonialism needs to be located within its
cultural and discursive context. In the next two sections, the article defines
neopatrimonialism in the most general sense and then goes on to show why it
involves more than its material dimensions.
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Neopatrimonialism: History of a Concept
The term neopatrimonialism was originally coined by Shmuel Eisenstadt
(Gazibo 2012, 1). It arose out of the debates about whether it is possible to use
patrimonialism to analyze contemporary societies. Eisenstadt thought that
“patrimonialism” could be used to analyze current forms of political systems
but that we needed to be aware of both similarities and differences between tra-
ditional and modern forms. According to Eisenstadt (1973), in modern socie-
ties, patrimonialism operated under more complex systems as the role of
modern states was different. He therefore used the term neopatrimonialism to
denote the operation of patrimonialism in modern societies (Eisenstadt 1973).
In contemporary political science literature, neopatrimonialism refers to
the simultaneous operation of two Weberian ideal typical forms of domina-
tion: the patrimonial and the legal-rational (von Soest et al. 2011, 1309).
Under pure patrimonialism, there is no distinction between the private and
the public realms. All political relations are personal relations directly tied to
the ruler. Under neopatrimonialism, formal rules do exist but they are not al-
ways observed as “the patrimonial penetrates the legal-rational system and
twists its logic, functions, and effects” (Erdmann and Engel 2006, 18). Thus,
we see a dual system in which modern bureaucracy exists side by side with ele-
ments of personalistic rule. As Erdmann and Engel (2007, 114) argue, “Public
norms under neopatrimonialism are formal and rational, but their social prac-
tice is often personal and informal.”
Neopatrimonialism as Material Exchange and Beyond
According to Weber (1978, 231), “patriarchalism is the situation where,
within a group (household) which is usually organized on both an economic
and a kinship basis, a particular individual governs who is designated by a de-
finitive rule of inheritance.” Patrimonialism came to existence when a (mili-
tary and administrative) staff was introduced to the patriarchal system:
“Patrimonialism . . . tend[s] to arise whenever traditional domination de-
velops an administration and a military force which are purely personal in-
struments of the master” (Weber 1978, 231). Patrimonialism therefore comes
into existence as an extension of the ruler’s authority (who is assumed, by de-
fault, to be male) in the household.
Tradition constitutes a crucial element of patrimonialism. Weber (1978,
232) describes patrimonial domination as “primarily traditional, even though
it is exercised by virtue of the ruler’s personal autonomy.” By traditional au-
thority Weber (1978, 215) means authority based “on an established belief in
the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising
authority under them.”
Guenther Roth bases his concept on Weber’s but he goes on to distinguish
two types of patrimonialism traditionalist patrimonial regimes and modern
326 M. Ugur-Cinar
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/sp/article-abstract/24/3/324/4079499
by Bilkent University Library (BILK) user
on 22 July 2018
personalist patrimonialism. The first is disappearing. With regard to the sec-
ond, “[t]he type of patrimonialism is personal rulership on the basis of loyal-
ties that do not require any belief in the ruler’s unique personal qualification,
but are inextricably linked to material incentives and rewards.” This material-
ist definition has dominated the neopatrimonialism literature, as reflected in
the work of Guliyev and Hartlyn discussed below. As a result, neopatrimonial-
ism came to be defined as a material exchange in which the ruled traded loy-
alty and political support for economic benefits provided by the rulers.
Thus, Guliyev (2011, 578) states that neopatrimonialism retains the arbitrari-
ness of patrimonialism but not traditionalism. Under neopatrimonial adminis-
tration, the state’s coercive and administrative apparatuses are subordinated “to
the individual executive on the basis of the ‘loyalty and rewards’ principle”
(Guliyev 2011, 583). Similarly, Hartlyn claims that neopatrimonialism is no lon-
ger based on the traditional appeals to legitimate authority but rather on “the
centralization of power in the hands of the ruler” and “a blurring of public and
private purposes within the administration” (Hartlyn 1994, 94).
Pitcher et al., however, reject the depiction of neopatrimonialism as purely
material. They believe that Weber was concerned with “the diverse ways in
which the legitimate exercise of power could be culturally framed” and there-
fore “attempted to examine how the dominated understand, participate in,
and even celebrate their domination” (Pitcher et al. 2009, 126–7). This article
builds on this insight, bringing to the fore important, but often overlooked,
aspects of the operation of neopatrimonialism. I will show that there are cul-
tural frames that underlie neopatrimonial practices, which help to make them
acceptable to at least parts of society. This study will argue that it is not possi-
ble to contest neopatrimonialism at the high political level without contesting
the patriarchal codes that underpin it at the societal level.
To emphasize the discursive mechanisms through which neopatrimonial-
ism is sustained is not to downplay its material basis. As our discussion of the
Turkish case will also show, neopatrimonialism as a hybrid of personal patri-
monial rule and legal-rational formal rule to a large extent does owe its exis-
tence to the material exchange built between the ruler and the ruled.
However, material exchanges constitute necessary yet insufficient conditions
for the reproduction of neopatrimonialism. To stress the economic side of the
story is to neglect how regimes are legitimized in the eyes of the citizens. It is
thus important to analyze the legitimizing and normalizing aspect of neopatri-
monialism, which is built through patriarchy.
Neopatrimonialism Embedded in its Patriarchal
Discursive Framework
The issue of legitimation cannot be ignored if we want to understand the
functioning of regimes. As Pierson (2011, 17) suggests, issues of authority and
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legitimacy are central to the modern state as “no state can survive for very
long exclusively through its power to coerce” and “a stable state requires that
. . . most of the people most of the time will accept its rule.” It is not sufficient,
or possible, to gain the loyalty of the majority of the population by either co-
ercing them or buying them out with material resources. In addition to such
practices, the state needs to put legitimating mechanisms in place.
In this context, patriarchy can play an important role. As a storyline learnt
from childhood, normalized through socializing institutions and everyday
practices, patriarchy creates an economy of politics. By providing shortcuts in
the minds of citizens, politicians can rely on culturally embedded roles and
obligations about family members. As fathers and husbands, state authorities
are to be esteemed as natural sources of authority. At times as children and at
times as wives, citizens are expected to follow the lead of the all-knowing
leader who will bring happiness and fortune to the rest.
In her analysis of the relationship between nationalism and gender,
McClintock (1995) argues that family tropes help to naturalize the hierarchy be-
tween members of the nation: “Since the subordination of woman to man and
child to adult was deemed a natural fact, hierarchies within the nation could be
depicted in familial terms to guarantee social difference as a category of nature”
(McClintock 1995, 357–8). The same logic holds for democracy and subject for-
mation. Since democracy is a regime in which the ruler and the ruled are
deemed equal, patriarchal discourse helps to naturalize political hierarchies.
Thus, patriarchy needs to be understood as involving more than the in-
equality as between women and men. Patriarchy also involves other forms of
subordination such as those caused by neopatrimonialism. Neopatrimonialism
is a useful concept through which to analyze the effects of patriarchal dis-
courses on regime times in general, and democracy in particular, since it is a
regime type that effectively threatens democratic governance.
The article seeks to explain how patriarchy, with both its paternal and male-
dominant dimensions, endorses or even facilitates neopatrimonial rule. Thus
far, this point has not been central to the neopatrimonialism literature. This
neglect is surprising as both feminist and neopatrimonialism literatures have
departed from similar points in their discussion of power. Weber, to whom the
original study of patrimonialism is attributed, established a direct relationship
between patrimonialism and patriarchy. According to Weber, patriarchy refers
to “the social organization of power between men as exercised over women,
children and slaves.” Patrimonialism is a consequence of the extension of patri-
archy beyond the household through the assignment of land and equipment to
sons of the house or other dependents (Sydie 1987, 62 and 64).
Weber (1978, 1006–7) did not problematize the subordination of women
and children under patriarchal domination as the following quote clearly shows:
The woman is dependent because of the normal superiority of the
physical and intellectual energies of the male, and the child because of
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his objective helplessness, the grown-up because of habituation, the
persistent influence of education and the effect of firmly rooted memo-
ries from childhood and adolescence, and the servant because from
childhood on the facts of life have taught him that he lacks protection
outside the master’s power sphere and that he must submit to him to
gain that protection.
Feminists have accordingly criticized Weber’s approach to patriarchy (Adams
2005a; Sydie 1987). I argue that we also need to expose the socially con-
structed nature of the patriarchal basis of (neo)patrimonialism.
The feminist literature can be of significant help in developing an adequate
conceptualization of neopatrimonialism. At the same time, as Adams (2005b,
33) maintains, feminist theory “has failed to address and incorporate sociolog-
ical theories of state formation.” It is important, however, to probe how the
gendered discourse of the state and the regime serve as legitimation tools for
state officials.
Two scholars have analyzed the link between gender tropes and state legiti-
mation. One is Schatzberg, who in his studies of African regimes has pointed
at how gendered understandings of the state and society have influenced citi-
zens’ views of the state. Schatzberg (1993, 446) emphasizes the importance of
examining political language, including metaphors and other images used to
understand the cultural components of political legitimacy. These cultural
components consist of what Schatzberg calls “moral matrices.” These matrices
“form a culturally rooted template against which people come to understand
the political legitimacy, or ‘thinkability,’ of institutions, ideas, policies, and
procedures” (Schatzberg 2001, 1). The moral matrix is an “implicit cultural
and cognitive template encompassing the sum of tacit understandings of how
key political concepts, such as power, are intuitively and implicitly defined; of
what constitute the parameters of the political kingdom; and of how individ-
uals comprehend the forces of political causality (Schatzberg 2001, 35).
According to Schatzberg, the first principle upon which political legitimacy
in much of sub-Saharan Africa is based is that “the tacit normative idea that
government stands in the same relationship to its citizens as a father does to
his children. There is a substratum of belief which views paternal authority as
legitimate as long as the implicit understanding of rights and duties contained
in the moral matrix is not violated.” Paternal and familial metaphors espe-
cially revolve around “presidential fathers” and “the nation as family and as
growing child” (Schatzberg 1993, 455).
Thomas also provides sharp insights into the relationship between familial
discourse and political legitimacy. Thomas (2011, 4) begins with the finding
that “idealized relationships among families and between families and other
institutions provide important symbolic and discursive resources for political
actors.” Political leaders and mobilized citizens use such familial beliefs “to
provide the language, metaphors, symbols, and images that framed their
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political appeals, justified their political actions, and made sense of larger po-
litical events” (Thomas 2011, 5).
Given the crucial role of gender in our discussion of states and regimes, we
can benefit from radical feminist arguments that show how patriarchy is at the
core of political domination. Yet two additions need to be made. The first con-
cerns the need to recognize that gender inequality and patriarchy not only tar-
get women but also lead to undemocratic and unequal political practices.
Second we need to emphasize that male dominance is only part of the story.
While radical feminism was successful at pointing out the political power
asymmetries introduced by patriarchy, it has generally confined its under-
standing of patriarchy to male domination and, in fact, has defined patriarchy
as such (Arat 1989, 19; Bracke 2014; Thompson 2001, 60; Walby 1990, 19–20).
Radical feminists have recognized that men’s domination over women, in the
form of conjugal rights has preceded their domination over their children,
even when thought of in terms of simple chronology (Pateman 1988, 3). As
the person primarily to be credited for bringing patriarchy to the forefront of
feminist studies, Kate Millett (2000[1970], 25) recognized the dual nature of
patriarchy: “male shall dominate female, and elder male shall dominate youn-
ger.” Yet, she too, focused on the former at the expense of the latter due to the
“birthright priority whereby males rule females” (Millett 2000[1970], 25).
Radical feminism thus provides a good starting point. But by focusing on
the “male domination” aspect, feminism excludes the paternalistic aspect of
patriarchy, which is still very prominent in countries such as Turkey. Thus,
while Pateman notes that the social contract theories formulate a political
community of horizontal brotherhood at the expense of female subordina-
tion, the Turkish case demonstrates that young Turkish males are also far
from being included as equal members of the political community.1
As the Turkish case reveals, paternalism constitutes an essential
element of patriarchy and it is vital to understanding the patriarchy–
neopatrimonialism linkage. Hence, we need to extend the definition of
patriarchy to highlight the place of paternalism, that is the dual use of a pa-
ternal political discourse to at once denote elder dominance of the youth
and the state dominance of its citizens. Only when we take into account this
dual nature of patriarchy can we fully grasp its power in the political arena.
The intertwined characteristics of patriarchy as male-domination and as the
rule of the elder are key ingredients of the authoritarian blend in Turkey
and other parts of the world.2
Neopatrimonialism and Patriarchy in Turkey
The Turkish political system includes all elements of a neopatrimonial re-
gime. In their seminal work on neopatrimonialism, Bratton and van de Walle
maintain that “the characteristic feature of neopatrimonialism is the
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incorporation of patrimonial logic into bureaucratic institutions.” The chief
executive and the inner circle of the chief executive “undermine the nominally
modern state administration by using it for systematic patronage and clientel-
istic practices in order to maintain political order” (Bratton and van de Walle
1997, 62). Thus, the Turkish case can be defined as neopatrimonial as even
though the leader has a lot of room for maneuver, there also exists an elabo-
rate network of political and bureaucratic institutions, which give the regime
a legal-rational appearance.
Bratton and van de Walle identify three core elements of neopatrimonial
regimes: presidentialism, systematic clientelism, and the use of state resources
for political legitimation. Presidentialism is defined as “the systematic concen-
tration of political power in the hands of one individual, who resists delegat-
ing all but the most trivial decision-making tasks” (Bratton and van de Walle
1997, 63). Systematic clientelism involves awarding personal favors to secure
political support and obedience. Such favors include public sector jobs as well
as distribution of public resources through licenses, contracts, and projects
(Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 65). Since neopatrimonial leaders make little
distinction between public and private coffers, they use state resources for
their political needs (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 66).
In Turkey, the leader has increasingly occupied the role of the main actor
in politics. The most powerful figure was originally the prime minister but af-
ter each military intervention, presidents gained more power and in the con-
troversial referendum held in April 2017, Turkey formally switched to a
presidential regime.
There has long been a tension between neopatrimonialism and democracy
in Turkey. The Turkish state has long been the dominant actor in Turkish pol-
itics and the rule of law was always problematic.3 Yet apart from the period of
single-party rule that lasted until 1950, politicians have had to share power
with the undemocratic military establishment and/or with their coalition part-
ners. The nature of coalition governments helped to curb personalism as no
party had full control over state resources. Nevertheless, with the fading of
military power and with AKP’s consolidation of its single-party power, neopa-
trimonialism has become a dominant characteristic of the Turkish political
system.
With regard to the systematic concentration of personalistic power, the
main political figure is the former prime minister, now president, Erdogan.
Erdogan is very open about the personalistic aspects of his rule as his use of
possessive adjectives while talking about state officials as well as citizens re-
veals. The following represent some examples of this: “my citizens,” “my
Kurdish brothers,” “my Minister of Foreign Affairs,” “my charge d’affaires,”
“my ministers,” “my women’s branches,” “my head of the youth branches,”
“my Minister of Interior,” “my Minister of Justice,” “my chief of the general
staff” (Basaran 2012; T24 2013). When the editor-in-chief of the daily
Habertürk acknowledged regular phone calls from government officials and
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publicly claimed to be under constant political pressure (Hürriyet Daily News
2014), Erdogan responded that he or his friends make such calls to the media
whenever they feel it is necessary.
The second component of neopatrimonialism, systematic clientelism, is
also widely observed in Turkey. Systematic clientelism is especially visible in
the media and in the business sector. Media companies and business corpora-
tions loyal to the current government are rewarded for their support with gov-
ernment contracts and concessions (Çarkoglu and Yavuz 2010, 618; Silverman
2014) whereas media sources critical of government policies face punishments
such as tax investigations or pressure to fire journalists. One prominent exam-
ple is the Dogan Media case. Following criticism of the government and the
coverage of a scandal involving an Islamist charity and some AKP officials in
2009, Dogan Media, the largest media conglomerate in Turkey, faced a total
of $3.5 billion in tax charges by the Ministry of Finance, which nearly equaled
the total value of Dogan’s assets (Yesil 2014, 165; see also Yılmaz 2013).
A similar pattern can be discerned in the case of the Koç Company. Like
Dogan, Koç has also faced direct economic punishment after being personally
targeted in Erdogan’s speeches. During the summer 2013 Gezi protests, the
Divan Hotel owned by the Koç Company opened its doors to demonstrators
wounded by pepper gas and police brutality. Erdogan, who accused the hotel
of harboring criminals, stated the following: “We know those who cooperate
with terrorists and accommodate them in their hotels. We will settle accounts
on this” (Gursel 2014). Subsequently, tax inspectors and police raided Tupras,
Koç’s refinery subsidiary. The government canceled a e1.1 billion tender for
Koç to build Turkey’s first warship (Dombey 2013). Record-level tax penalties
were issued against the Koç Group. On 13 December, Koç’s Yapı ve Kredi
Bankası was fined $56 million, followed on 17 December by Tofaş (Fiat), the
largest automotive company in the country, with $29.3 million. Tupras was
penalized with $179.1 million (Gursel 2014). Erdogan openly used his stick–
carrot mechanism. Upon hearing that some companies were canceling their
spots at the planned shopping mall which was going to replace the Gezi Park
had it been demolished, Erdogan (Bianet 2013a) said “If any company is can-
celling their agreements as a result of the [Gezi] events, they will pay a hefty
price for it . . . These companies have always received a lot of support from us
thus far.”
Opposition is hard to maintain in this atmosphere. Many journalists have
in fact been fired from their jobs (television and/or newspaper) and have been
put to jail for criticizing Erdogan’s rule. Overall, journalistic freedom in
Turkey has declined under the AKP government. (For more on press censor-
ship, firings, and resignations see Yesil 2014. See also Corke et al. 2014.) As of
2017, Turkey was categorized as “not free” based on its press freedom by the
Freedom House (Freedom of the Press 2017: Turkey Profile). Reporters with-
out Borders (2017) list Turkey 155th out of 180 in terms of press freedom.
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The classification of Turkey as neopatrimonial may strike some as surpris-
ing as countries described as neopatrimonial normally have the following
common characteristics: colonial legacies, weak states, unfair elections or no
elections at all (Compagnon, 2012, 54; Erdmann and Engel 2006, 19–20;
Erdmann and Engel 2007, 114; Mentan 2004, 223). Erdmann and Engel
(2006, 19–20), for example, explain the colonial roots of African neopatrimo-
nialism by noting that, historically, the legal-rational sphere in the colonies
was confined to the center of power at the colonial capital. It thus reached
only the population of European descent and some small immigrant groups.
The rest of the society was under indirect rule, governed by intermediary au-
thority, which constituted the realm of patrimonial rule, of kings, chiefs, and
elders. After World War II, colonial powers briefly made an effort “to build
up a legal rational bureaucracy that included . . . to some degree Africans.”
This period was too short and the resources too scarce to establish “a major
and lasting move to an ‘autonomous’ legal-rational bureaucratic culture.”
Thus, after independence, “with the Africanisation of the bureaucracy and the
establishment of authoritarian rule, the bureaucracy was extended and at the
same time challenged and invaded from above and below by informal rela-
tionships” (Erdmann and Engel 2006, 19).
The case for neopatrimonialism in Turkey thus seems unlikely. Turkey has
no colonial legacy, it is categorized as a strong state, its bureaucratic institu-
tions are capable of operating. Further, it used to have a long parliamentary
tradition, and elections were mostly known to be fair. Why then have neo-
patrimonial tendencies become dominant in contemporary Turkey?
The existing literature on patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism in
Turkey focuses on the sultanistic legacy of Ottoman rule (Inalcik 1992). The
patrimonial nature of Ottoman rule has meant that pluralism and civil society
have been approached with skepticism in Turkish politics (Mardin 1969).
Research on the history of contemporary Turkey has mostly focused on the
material bases of exchange between the ruler and the ruled based on the clien-
telistic relationship built between them (Sayarı 2011).
The clientelistic relationship existed mainly between local notables, CHP’s
(Republican People’s Party-Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) grassroot organizations,
and state officials during the single party era (1923–1946) (Sayarı 2014). The
Democrat Party, which came to power after the single-party period, incorpo-
rated the rural population in a clientelistic network and established
patronage-induced private entrepreneurship, which then became permanent
features of center-right politics in Turkey (Sunar 1990). As Sayarı (2014, 659)
argues, the politicization of existing vertical networks of clientelistic ties dur-
ing the early years of the multi-party period are in marked contrast with hori-
zontal solidarities based on common class or group affiliations that constitute
the core of voter alignment in Western Europe. Recent research on Turkish
politics has shifted the focus from rural to urban forms of clientelism due to
the increasing levels of rural to urban migration (Sayarı 2014, 660). Such
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networks have become very extensive and elaborate in the era of the AKP
(Sayarı 2014, 664–5).
Konak and Dönmez (2015, 66–7) have recently noted that in addition to
the clientelistic basis of Turkish politics, the AKP has utilized majoritarian
electoral authoritarianism and the formation of a security oriented police
state.
The supporters of neopatrimonial policies are not limited to those who
reap material benefits of such policies. Yet as the Turkish case suggests, politi-
cians might in fact be very open about their neopatrimonial activities and still
have wide public support without such neopatrimonial policies necessarily
benefiting society at large. To understand this dynamic, we need to bring in
patriarchal discourses and cultural frames, which complement material based
explanations of neopatrimonialism.
In the Service of Neopatrimonialism: Patriarchal
Discourse in Action
The Turkish case illustrates how the paternalistic aspect of patriarchy oper-
ates in tandem with male domination. The language used and the ease with
which analogies can be made between the state and the family and the ruler
and the father is striking. The AKP government, led by Erdogan, routinely
makes statements that attempt to control the lives of women. Erdogan has
urged women to give birth to at least three children, has called birth control
treason, and has made stark comments against cesarean section and abortion
(Radikal 2014; The Independent 2012). Such acts are seen as treason because
they lead to lower population growth. Through such statements he positions
himself as the one who knows what is best for the nation, reinforcing his sta-
tus as the personalistic head of a neopatrimonial rule.
In addition to seeing women as subordinate to men, the political leadership
identifies women as “their” mothers, daughters, and sisters (Ntvmsnbc 2013)
rather than as women or citizens.
Erdogan, instead of acknowledging young women as women, insists on
calling them his daughters. This applies mostly to women with headscarves
whom he frequently calls “benim başörtülü kızlarım (my headscarved
daughters)” (Hürriyet 2013). It did not make a difference that most of such
women were middle aged.
The treatment of women within this patriarchal framework is dependent
on where women stand in the neopatrimonial spectrum, i.e. their relationship
and attitude toward the leader. This differential treatment, in which “only the
deserving will be protected,” is captured by Kandiyoti’s (2014) analysis of two
episodes in Turkey’s recent history. The first concerns the alleged attack on a
veiled woman in front of Istanbul’s Kabataş dock at the height of the Gezi
protests. Although CCTV footage has later challenged this story, “this incident
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had the PM [Erdogan] fuming over the affront to ‘our sister’ that demon-
strated the violent, barbaric and anti-religious disposition of the protesters.”
Kandiyoti contrasts this incident with an earlier episode concerning a female
demonstrator, who, during a protest in Ankara in June 2011, climbed on a
tank and was savagely beaten by the police. This time the former PM belittled
the incident, “. . . casting aspersions on her virginity he left his listeners in no
doubt that he thought her of small virtue, as would be expected from her un-
seemly, unfeminine behavior. The message could not be clearer: only the de-
serving (our sisters) are worthy of protection, the rest, and especially women
with the audacity to break the norms of modesty and protest in public put
themselves in jeopardy.”
In addition to the omnipresent male domination, we also need to scruti-
nize the strong paternalistic tones of Turkish patriarchalism. The Gezi protests
became an epitome of the state’s patriarchal attitude toward its citizens.
During the protests, Erdogan (Bianet 2013b) addressed the “young kids”
[genç yavrularımız] in Gezi Park: “Please do not fall prey to the games of ille-
gal organizations. We have maintained our patience but we are reaching its
end. I am warning you for the last time. I am saying ‘mothers, fathers take
care of your children [yavrularınıza sahip çıkın]’.” In the aftermath of Gezi,
Erdogan maintained that the “interest lobby” and the enemies of Turkey prof-
ited by the protests whereas “young people became victims of this plot.”
Thus, undermining the agency of the protestors, Erdogan (CNN Turk 2014A)
argued that the youth protesting in Gezi Park were manipulated by those who
wanted to harm Turkey’s international image and its economy.
The description of the Gezi protestors as youth is questionable. According
to Konda’s Gezi survey (Konda 2014, 8), the average age of the respondents
was 28. Konda has also observed that the protesters were representative of
Turkish society since the average age is 30.3 in Turkey (30.1 in Istanbul). Only
22% of the Gezi Park protesters were 20 years old or younger. The majority of
the protesters did not comprise high school students or college students in
their freshman or sophomore year (June 5, 2014, 9).
Schatzberg (2001, 25) suggests that the depiction of the father chief has im-
portant consequences for the political opposition. If the presidents are the “fa-
thers” of their respective national “family,” their people are reduced to the
role of his children. These regimes can present, therefore, any political protest
as the work of “ungrateful” or “misguided” or “wayward” children. They are
all brothers and sisters, and like siblings who squabble over inconsequential
matters, citizens do also. Important political questions may thus be presented
as the petty sibling rivalries of those lacking in maturity. And the “father”
must occasionally “discipline” naughty and immature children for their own
good. The political consequences of framing the political discussion in this
manner are important as the metaphors contribute to an implicit “infantiliza-
tion” of the population.
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Thus, by depicting the protesters as children, Erdogan and the AKP gov-
ernment attempted to deny the protesting citizens agency and to delegitimize
their claims for a more democratic and pluralistic society. Thus state paternal-
ism explicitly portrayed the protestors as younger citizens even though most
of them were well above 18, the age one is legally considered an adult and eli-
gible to vote in Turkey.
State paternalism does not stop with young people but is expanded to all
citizens. In a very striking statement, more recently Erdogan likened his job to
that of a shepherd: “The one who does not understand the philosophy and
psychology of being a shepherd, cannot rule people. I am a shepherd, too.”
(Sputniknews 2016).
Through paternalism, the state is seen as the source of wisdom, protection,
and growth for its citizens as bans on alcohol in Turkey and Erdogan’s call on
married couples to have at least three children have shown (Daloglu 2013;
Hürriyet Daily News 2013; The Economist 2013) Paternalism’s links to neo-
patrimonialism are commonplace in Turkish society. The earlier example of
Erdogan’s relationship with the media is just once such illustration. As he said
at the time, “When such insults are made, I or my friends call to tell [newspa-
per executives] . . . I don’t know if it is wrong [telling them] this. But we have
to teach such things . . . [emphasis added]” (Hürriyet Daily News 2014). Here
the all-knowing leader teaches the media how to conduct its job.
Another example is Erdogan’s reaction to smoking. Whenever he sees
someone with a pack of cigarettes, he confiscates the cigarettes, asks the per-
son to put on the package the date, his signature and a sentence that states
that the person has quit. On one occasion, Erdogan got furious when a group
of people saw him yet did not put out their cigarettes. He called these people
shameless because they continued to smoke even though he told them other-
wise (Haberturk 2014). What is at stake here is not only a fight against a nox-
ious substance. It is also an attempt to make everyone obey the lifestyle he
deems fit for society.
The private and public roles of the leader are also conflated and merged
with familial roles. Erdogan’s relationship to a group of celebrities in Turkey
reflects this. For example, a well-known TV star, Murat Yıldırım, depicted
Erdogan as godfather (manevi baba). Thus, Erdogan was the one who asked
Yıldırım’s would-be wife’s father for her hand on behalf of him (Yeni 2017).
In a similar vein, a Turkish singer Alisan also stated that he kept his promise
to the president to marry someone within 6 months and that his biggest
dream is that the president would attend his wedding (Internetmedya 2017).
Overall, we can discern a pattern in which there is a deliberate conflation
of personality and state. This happens in two intertwined steps: First, we ob-
serve the equation of the family with the state. Second, we see the reflection of
norms and expectations that apply to the family, on to the state. Through
these two steps everyday neopatrimonialism is normalized in Turkey. In other
words, the familial feeds the neopatrimonial.
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In addition to the discursive practices, policies also reinforce the appeal of
the neopatrimonial regime. Social benefits have been tied much more openly
to the AKP rule and to Erdogan in particular. As a result, instead of seeing
such benefits as a citizenship rights, some parts of society have come to see
them as favors provided by the president. It is common to see individuals
thank the president in the news for helping them out on a health matter or
other social issue. Thus, the political leadership has become popular especially
for sectors of the society that did not benefit extensively from the formal social
security network (Bugra and Candas 2011). Designating women as the recipi-
ents as primary caregivers has furthered this patriarchal trend (Yılmaz Şener
2016). It is no surprise that the party’s strongest support lies with the less edu-
cated, poor and female voters who are confined to their homes and looking to
the AKP and Erdogan as sources of social security (Çarkoglu and Aytaç 2015;
Cinar 2016; Gidengil and Karakoç 2016). Thus, one could argue that the neo-
patrimonial trend is reinforced by material as well as discursive practices.
Conclusion
This article has shown that to understand how even in the age of democ-
racy, modern bureaucracy and legal-rationality, regimes can justify neopatri-
monial and authoritarian traits, we need to look at how gender operates as a
regulating discourse. The gendered discourse enables the state to legitimately
balance the egalitarian components of democracy with the hierarchical aspira-
tions of its authority. Patriarchy both reduces women and (most) men to a
position of submissiveness in which personal favors replace legal entitlements
of citizens.
I have tried to show in this article that patriarchal discourses are at the
heart of politics. They have an impact on sustaining a regime type and proj-
ecting certain types of authority. By naturalizing hierarchies between the ruler
and the ruled and by dismissing pluralism and the value of differing opinions
they are detrimental to democracy. They can subvert the authority of rule of
law and established institutions and play in the hands of the personalistic au-
thority of the ruler as the case of neopatrimonialism illustrates. As the
all-knowing patriarch who knows what is best, the neopatrimonial leader be-
comes the bearer of national interest and the embodiment of the nation.
Institutions still exist, but they are auxiliary to the rule of the leader. They can
be bent according to his will and they can be constantly undermined in a pop-
ulist fashion. In this system, the people are depicted as in need of help, guid-
ance and protection. They are infantilized and seen as naı̈ve and vulnerable at
best, being open to manipulation at worst.
Tradition and culture of course are not natural, holistic or deterministic.
As the nationalism literature has shown us (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), po-
litical entrepreneurs borrow selectively from a country’s cultural and historical
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repertoire and even invent new traditions. In other words, patriarchy is repro-
duced strategically and dynamically. Moreover, as alternative formulations of
especially feminists have shown, countries are not bounded by hegemonic for-
mulations. Yet the socialization of citizens within patriarchal families, in
schools, and through the media gives strength to some framings of culture.
Such socialization also enables some analogies between the state and the fam-
ily more than others.
Although patriarchal stories have a wide range, they are not omnipotent.
There is still room to challenge such stories and the undemocratic political re-
gimes that accompany them. As the widespread use of subversive slogans on
gender and patriarchy at the Gezi protests have shown, the opposition can
challenge patriarchal authority at its very core. At Gezi, using patriarchal
tropes in a subversive manner the protesters tried to unsettle the patriarchal
premises of authority by severing the patriarchal ties that bound them to the
state.
As Gramsci (1971) argued, the strongest form of compliance mechanism is
the hegemonic form. It is so automatic, almost second nature, that states do
not need to use any additional force or persuasion mechanisms.
Consequently, paying attention to and problematizing gender hegemony is
likely to open liberating possibilities that are too important to be neglected.
Notes
Meral Ugur-Cinar received her PhD in Political Science from the University of
Pennsylvania in 2012. She was a Mellon Interdisciplinary Postdoctoral Fellow at
the New School for Social Research in 2012–2013. Her research interests include
political institutions, democracy, citizenship, collective memory, social move-
ments, and gender. Her articles appeared in PS: Political Science & Politics,
Political Studies, Political Quarterly, Middle Eastern Studies, Mediterranean
Studies, and Turkish Studies. A chapter she coauthored with Rogers Smith can be
found in Political Peoplehood: The Roles of Values, Interests and Identities
(Chicago University Press). Her book titled Collective Memory and National
Membership: Identity and Citizenship Models in Turkey and Austria is published
by Palgrave. Meral is currently Assistant Professor at Bilkent University, Ankara,
Turkey.
1. Pateman (1988, 4) acknowledges that her use of patriarchy is geographically
bound and historically contextualized.
2. Among other cases, e.g. African cases, see, for example Schatzberg (1993).
On paternal seniority in Indonesia, see Nilan and Demartoto (2012).
3. In Turkey, rule of law was either put in jeopardy by leaders who wanted to
rule by decree (such as Adnan Menderes and Turgut €Ozal) and the military, who
assumed the duty to intervene in politics and changed the rules of the game
many times. On Menderes’ violation of rule of law, see €Ozbudun (2000, 31). On
€Ozal’s subversion of the rule of law, see, for example, €Oniş (2004).
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Hürriyet. 2012. Dindar bir gençlik yetiştirmek istiyoruz [We want to raise a pious
youth.] http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/19819295.asp, 1 February.
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